TWR Nov 2026_ebook - Flipbook - Page 15
RESILIENCE|INDUSTRY COMMENT
from individual projects to multiple,
potentially connected assets, clear
system coordination becomes
increasingly important.
contracts and licences may address
others. Whether a material gap exists is a question of evidence.
If there is a gap, who pays?
The limits of contracts
Contracts can allocate controllable
underperformance through liquidated damages, indemnities, performance security and step-in rights.
However, they are not a complete
substitute for system coordination,
contingency capacity or decisions
across organisational boundaries.
Provider liabilities will normally be
bounded so the project remains
financeable, while bidders may price,
cap or exclude correlated risks they
cannot control. The more a consequence depends on events outside
the project, the harder it is for the provider to manage or price it efficiently.
Contractual remedies also operate after the event. Step-in can
restore control after default, but it
cannot create water or finish an
incomplete asset mid-drought. A
payment following failure allocates
financial loss but does not keep
customers supplied: compensation is not resilience. Nor does an
adverse outcome prove that the
provider caused the whole loss; the
counterfactual matters.
Redundancy shows where these
limits matter most. If sources A and
B sit within one water company, it
can plan for both failing at once. If
ownership and delivery are separated, neither provider may carry
that joint-failure exposure, yet the
water company remains obliged to
supply its customers. Does the network then need a third source, C?
If so, who pays, and do the benefits
of separation justify the additional
redundancy?
This is the potential resilience
gap: the part of the system’s ability to withstand and recover from
stress that is not clearly owned,
controlled or funded once delivery
is separated. A gap is not inevitable. Retained responsibilities may
already be recognised in the
water company’s settlement, and
THE UK WATER REPORT
The six questions in the box test
whether the boundary works
operationally. A separate test is
needed before concluding that
any retained exposure requires additional funding.
If a gap does arise, it helps to
distinguish financing (the capital that
pays for an asset before it earns revenue) from funding (where the money
ultimately comes from). Under every
delivery route, customers, and in
some cases taxpayers, ultimately
fund the bill. Moving an asset off the
water company’s balance sheet
does not, by itself, make its retained
role more or less valuable.
We use four questions to test that:
›What has transferred to the provider: which project risks, functions
and decisions?
›What remains with the water company: which functions, interfaces
and exposures?
›What difference does the separation actually make, compared with
what would have happened had
the project performed as planned?
›Is that difference already recognised, through allowed returns,
expenditure allowances, incentives,
By Emily Armstrong-Nielsen, principal, Frontier
Economics; and Steve Gummer, partner and Bridget
Newman, associate, both at Sharpe Pritchard LLP.
uncertainty mechanisms, insurance
or contractual protections?
The order matters. It avoids assuming that separation automatically
leaves something unpaid for, while
allowing a targeted response where
evidence shows a material mismatch.
Valuing that difference may
be the hardest part. A delay may
make restrictions more likely or
erode headroom without producing a neat cash cost. Many projects
may need nothing new, and DPC or
SIPR need not, by itself, change the
water company’s allowed return.
The question is whether the existing
settlement already recognises the
role it retains, without paying twice.
Looking at the whole picture
The choice is therefore not between competition and resilience.
DPC, SIPR and in-house delivery
offer different combinations of
control, risk allocation and delivery
TESTING THE BOUNDARY: SIX QUESTIONS
1. Dual outcomes. Does the business case define both the asset outcome and the system outcome?
2. Perimeter and dependencies. Is it clear what the provider is responsible for, and what it relies on others to deliver? An asset that can be
physically separated does not necessarily have separable operations
and risks.
3. Control and information. Does the party bearing a risk have the
authority and information needed to manage it? In an emergency, is
it clear who decides?
4. Causation and attribution. If something goes wrong, can the
arrangements distinguish what the provider caused from what the
drought, or other conditions, would have caused regardless? Is there
a clear way to resolve disputes about causation?
5. Capacity. Does the provider have the operational and financial
capacity to meet its obligations, including under concurrent stress?
6. Governance and funding. Is it clear who coordinates the system
day to day and in a crisis? Are the provider and the water company
each paid for the risks and responsibilities they actually hold, without
gaps or double payment?
incentives. The appropriate route
depends on the system’s needs,
the project itself and which allocation offers the best whole-life value.
The provider boundary may also
evolve. Future providers could be
involved earlier in design, take responsibility across the asset lifecycle
or manage a portfolio of connected
assets. Such models would move
risk effectively only where control,
information, capability and financial
capacity move with it, and they may
bring trade-offs such as concentration risk or reduced competition.
The cumulative effect matters. A
series of sensible project-by-project
decisions can reshape how the
system operates. With a growing
pipeline of major projects and a
move towards more integrated
regulation, now is the time to look
at the whole picture, not just each
project in turn.
Existing arrangements already
address many of these issues
through planning, licences, price
controls, project agreements and
regulatory oversight. The question is
whether they will remain sufficient
as more major assets are delivered
by third parties. Success should be
judged not only by efficient asset
delivery but by whether the resulting
system stays resilient. For each new
project, two questions follow: could
a material resilience gap arise and,
if so, does it call for a different regulatory or contractual response? TWR
❙ Sharpe Pritchard LLP and Frontier
Economics have published a series
of papers which explore these
questions in more detail (Paper 1,
Paper 2, Paper 3).
November 2026
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