TWR Nov 2026_ebook - Flipbook - Page 14
INDUSTRY COMMENT|RESILIENCE
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INDUSTRY COMMENT
A RISK LEFT BEHIND?
Sharpe Pritchard
and Frontier
Economics ask,
who manages
system resilience
in an unbundled
water future?
Imagine it is 2038. A third-party
provider is delivering a new
strategic reservoir, competitively
procured and financed under a
long-term contract or licence that
places construction, financing
and defined asset-performance
risks with that provider. Overruns
have pushed completion past the
planned date. Then, before the
reservoir enters service, the worst
drought on record hits the region.
Demand peaks just as the system
has the least room to respond.
At that point, the key questions
concern the whole system. Who
keeps customers supplied and
coordinates alternatives? Which
consequences arise from the delay
rather than the drought itself? Who
decides how scarce capacity is
used, and who ultimately bears the
consequences?
The answer starts with the
water company. Its statutory and
customer-facing supply responsibilities remain even where it does not
own or wholly control the strategic
asset, and customers will look to it
when restrictions loom. But the consequences are not black and white.
The drought might have required
restrictions even with the reservoir
in service. The delay may instead
bring restrictions forward, make
them more severe or extend them.
Across a network of separately
owned and financed assets, distinguishing those effects becomes
more important.
Where does resilience sit?
Where one organisation delivers and operates an asset while
another remains responsible for
keeping the taps running across the
wider system, control, responsibility
and financial return may no longer
align once the asset is separated.
A provider can be responsible for
delivering a reservoir on time and
keeping it available without answering for how it interacts with the
wider network in a drought. A clear
physical boundary does not mean
that the consequences of failure
stop at that boundary. Some system
risks, such as two separately delivered sources failing together, may
sit outside any individual contract
and remain with the water company as system operator, as part of
its wider supply responsibilities.
This is particularly true in water,
where a source’s value depends on
location, quality, treatment, storage,
transfers and timing. A contract can
allocate a project risk; it cannot, by
itself, determine how several sources,
companies and demand measures
respond when risks are correlated
across the network. The less interchangeable the water and the
more shared the benefit, the harder
it is to treat the asset boundary as
the system boundary.
Three routes, one system
outcome
The choice between in-house
delivery, Direct Procurement for
Customers (DPC) and the Specified
Infrastructure Projects Regulations
(SIPR) changes where financing,
ownership, control and risk sit.
❙ In-house delivery: The project
remains within the water company’s regulatory perimeter and
price control, with the company
retaining delivery, financing and
operational risk.
❙ DPC: The water company appoints a Competitively Appointed
Provider (CAP) under a long-term
contract; defined project risks can
move to the CAP.
❙ SIPR: A separately licensed, ringfenced Infrastructure Provider (IP)
delivers the project under a projectspecific regulatory framework.
Legal form alone does not
settle where risk sits. What matters
is what the provider controls, what
information it receives and whether
it can finance the consequences it
assumes. Across DPC and SIPR, the
water company still retains important customer-facing and system
responsibilities.
Moving from in-house delivery to
DPC and then SIPR generally increases institutional separation. This can
sharpen delivery incentives and bring
in specialist expertise and additional
sources of capital. It can also multiply
the interfaces between control,
return and responsibility. The question
is whether the chosen boundary
improves whole-life value once the
wider system is taken into account.
This is what we mean by “unbundling”: not formal structural separation, but the division of ownership,
financing, delivery, operation, decisions and accountability between
organisations that must still deliver
a single outcome for customers.
Asset and system performance can
therefore diverge. An asset may
meet every contractual standard
while the wider system fails; conversely, alternative sources, network
flexibility or operational responses
may offset an underperforming
asset, keeping customers supplied.
As third-party delivery expands
RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER DIFFERENT MODELS
14
November 2026
THE UK WATER REPORT